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 The U.S. economy has become increasingly reliant on innovation in the face of global 
economic competition, and by the end of 2016, more than one third of the U.S. gross domestic 
product consisted of intellectual property-intensive industries.1  Intellectual property (“IP”) rights 
“facilitat[e] entrepreneurial growth, furthering scientific and economic progress.”2  This result 
continues to provide global benefits but has led multinational companies to seek solutions to 
manage IP more cost-effectively.3   
Due to the mobility of IP4, multinational companies can easily shift IP to countries that 
provide better tax incentives for investing in related research and development (“R&D”) 
activities.5  This allows companies to cut investment costs and reduce tax liabilities, resulting in 
a competitive advantage.6  In addition to helping companies participate in international 
competition, these incentives promote investment and economic and job growth in the countries 
providing the more attractive incentives.7  Recently, governments around the world have sought 
investment by offering a variety of tax incentives to taxpayers that make certain R&D 
expenditures.8  Tax incentives may be in the form of R&D credits, which operate at the front end 
                                                 
1 See EY, Global taxation of intellectual property: new and emerging tax policies create high-stakes balancing act, 
3 (2016), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-global-taxation-of-intellectual-property-
20160518.pdf/$FILE/EY-global-taxation-of-intellectual-property-20160518.pdf. 
2 Patent Boxes, Technological Innovation & Implications For Corporate Tax Reform, AMERICAN ACTION FORUM, 
Feb. 22, 2016, https://www.americanactionforum.org/research/patent-boxes-technological-innovation-implications-
for-corporate-tax-reform/. 
3 Global taxation of intellectual property, supra note 1 (“And the value of IP continues to grow in the global 
economy, driven by the network effects of new technologies and digital business models that extend innovation 
worldwide.”). 
4 Peter Merrill, Innovation Boxes: BEPS and Beyond, 69 NAT’L TAX J. 847, 857 (2016).  (“[A] key reason why IP 
income is mobile for tax purposes is the difficulty in determining the arm’s-length sourcing of this income in 
related-party transactions.”). 
5 Patent Boxes, Technological Innovation & Implications For Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 2. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 OECD, R&D Tax Incentives: United States, Measuring R&D Tax Incentives (Mar. 2017); see Patent Boxes, 
Technological Innovation & Implications For Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 2 (discussing the direct relation 
between the availability of research credits and increased research spending). 
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of investments, or patent boxes, which operate at the back end of investments.9  Throughout this 
note, the term “patent box” is used to refer to the back end incentive, although “patent box,” “IP 
box,” and “IP regime” all refer to the same type of incentive.  The use of one term over the 
others depends upon the regime implemented by a jurisdiction. 
This note examines tax incentives used in the United States and in other countries to 
promote investment in R&D.  Section II discusses the R&D incentives that the United States 
currently has in place.  Section III defines patent boxes and describes various regimes that have 
been implemented in other countries and that are compliant with international standards.  Section 
IV recommends retention of the current incentive structure in the United States and suggests that 
further efforts to encourage the adoption a patent box are unwarranted.  
II. CURRENT U.S. R&D INCENTIVE STRUCTURE 
The Internal Revenue Code (“IRC” or the “Code”) currently has two provisions that 
directly dictate the treatment of costs incurred in research and development.  IRC section 174 
allows taxpayers to either expense or capitalize research or experimental expenditures paid or 
incurred through December 31, 2021.10  However, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA”) 
amended this section for tax years beginning after December 31, 2021 and will require 
expenditures to be capitalized and amortized ratably over five years.11  The Code also provides 
for a research and experimentation tax credit (“R&E credit”).12  The R&E credit was introduced 
in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 198113 and became permanent as part of the Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113).14  
                                                 
9 Patent Boxes, Technological Innovation & Implications For Corporate Tax Reform, supra note 2. 
10 I.R.C. § 174 (2012). 
11 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 13206(e), 131 Stat. 2054 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 174). 
12 I.R.C. § 41 (2012).  
13 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221(a), 95 Stat. 172, 241 (1981). 
14 JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44522, A PATENT/INNOVATION BOX AS A TAX INCENTIVE FOR 
DOMESTIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 2 (2016). 
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Sections 174 (before the amendment takes affect) and 41 allow for immediate tax 
benefits, which is attractive to companies, considering the time value of money.  In addition, if 
an investment earns only enough to break even, allowing expensing produces the same effect as 
disallowing expensing and applying a zero tax rate to the income generated from the 
investment.15  Taxpayers may benefit from both IRC provisions simultaneously; however, there 
are limitations on the resulting benefits.16 
A. IRC Section 174 – Research and Experimental Expenditures 
 Currently, section 174 permits taxpayers to deduct reasonable research and experimental 
expenditures incurred in the taxpayer’s trade or business.17  The taxpayer is not required to make 
an election to benefit from this deduction.18  The taxpayer may elect to capitalize19 the 
expenditures, which supports the general rule of capitalizing these types of costs.20  Expenditures 
that qualify for treatment under this section include those that “represent research and 
development costs in the experimental or laboratory sense.”21  Experimental or laboratory costs 
are defined as expenditures “for activities intended to discover information that would eliminate 
                                                 
15 Id. 
16 See I.R.C. § 280C(c) (2012). 
17 I.R.C. § 174(a). “A taxpayer may treat research or experimental expenditures which are paid or incurred by him 
during the taxable year in connection with his trade or business as expenses which are not chargeable to capital 
account. The expenditures so treated shall be allowed as a deduction.”; Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(9) (as amended in 
2014) (discussing the requirement of reasonableness of costs paid or incurred). 
18 I.R.C. § 174(a)(2). Taxpayers may choose this method without consent of the Secretary during the first year such 
expenses are incurred.  
19 Capitalization refers to treating an expenditure related to property as a cost of that property, which increases the 
property’s basis.  Capitalization, WEST’S TAX LAW DICTIONARY, (2017).  Capitalization does not allow for an 
immediate deduction from income.  By contrast, a deduction allows a taxpayer to treat an expenditure as an 
immediate deduction from income.  Deductions, WEST’S TAX LAW DICTIONARY, (2017). 
20 I.R.C. § 174(b). If a taxpayer chooses not to immediately expense R&D costs, he or she may capitalize them and 
amortize the expenditures over a period not less than 60 months, starting in the month that the expenditures produce 
benefits to the taxpayer. If a taxpayer wishes to capitalize costs but failed to make this election in the first year, he or 
she must request permission from the Secretary. 
21 Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1). 
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uncertainty concerning the development or improvement of a product.”22  Additionally, 
qualifying costs include “costs incident to the development or improvement of a product [and]     
. . . costs of obtaining a patent, such as attorney’s fees expended in making and perfecting a 
patent application.”23  Success or failure of the end product does not affect a taxpayer’s 
eligibility for expensing.24  Costs associated with the following are explicitly excluded from 
treatment under this section: ordinary testing and inspections, efficiency surveys, management 
studies, consumer surveys, marketing, acquiring another’s patent, research of literary, historical, 
or similar projects, and exploration of ore, oil, gas, or other minerals.25  The acquisition cost of 
land or property that is subject to section 167 depreciation must not be expensed, but the 
depreciation expense associated with such property does qualify under this section.26 
 The expensing treatment that section 174 currently permits will not be available for costs 
paid or incurred during tax years beginning after December 31, 2021.27  The TCJA renamed 
these costs “specified research or experimental expenditures” and requires these expenditures to 
be capitalized.28  Taxpayers will be allowed an amortization deduction to be recognized over a 
five-year period, beginning with the midpoint of the tax year in which the costs are incurred.29  A 
fifteen-year amortization period is applied for investments attributable to foreign research, as 
defined in section 41.30  The amendment treats costs incurred in connection with software 
                                                 
22 Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1). “Uncertainty exists if the information available to the taxpayer does not establish the 
capability or method for developing or improving the product of the appropriate design of the product.” Once 
uncertainty is eliminated, subsequent costs are no longer eligible for expensing. 
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1). 
24 Id. 
25 Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(6); Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(c). 
26 Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(b). 
27 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 13206. 




development as specified research or experimental expenditures.31  This change from permitting 
expensing to requiring capitalization negatively impacts the incentive’s worth, considering the 
time value of money. It also harms taxpayers that retire or abandon investments because 
historically, taxpayers have fully deducted an asset’s remaining basis in such cases, but the new 
law will prevent such deductions.32 
B. IRC Section 41 – Credit for Increasing Research Activities 
Section 41 provides for a credit equal to 20% of qualified research expenses (“QREs”) 
that a taxpayer paid or incurred over a base amount.33  QREs include in-house research expenses 
and contract research expenses.34  The base amount is calculated as a fixed-based percentage 
multiplied by the average annual gross receipts from the four tax years prior to the credit year.35 
A research activity qualifies for this credit if the activity is conducted within the United 
States36 and passes four tests: the section 174 test, the technological information test, the 
business component test, and the process of experimentation test.37  The section 174 test requires 
that the research expenditures also qualify for treatment under section 174, as discussed in 
                                                 
31 Id. see Justin Silva, Tax Cut and Jobs Act changes to section 174 rules, RSM (Jan. 10, 2018), 
http://rsmus.com/what-we-do/services/tax/credits-and-incentives/tax-cut-and-jobs-act-changes-to-section-174-
accounting-method-ru.html (explaining how this change may harm taxpayers that previously expensed such costs 
under Revenue Procedure 2000-50 but may also be beneficial for taxpayers who wish to treat such costs as 
qualifying for the research and experimentation credit). 
32 Silva, supra note 31. 
33 I.R.C. § 41(a). “… [T]he research credit determined under this section for the taxable year shall be an amount 
equal to the sum of (1) 20 percent of the excess (if any) of — (A) the qualified research expenses for the taxable 
year, over (B) the base amount, (2) 20 percent of the basic research payments determined under subsection 
(e)(1)(A), and (3) 20 percent of the amounts paid or incurred by the taxpayer in carrying on any trade or business of 
the taxpayer during the taxable year (including as contributions) to an energy research consortium for energy 
research.” 
34 I.R.C. § 41(b). In-house research expenses include the following incurred for qualified services: wages, cost of 
supplies, and payment to a person for the right to use computers to conduct qualified research. Contract expenses are 
65% of the amounts paid to a person for qualified research. 
35 I.R.C. § 41(c). The percentage is determined based on the ratio of the aggregate of QREs for such tax years to the 
aggregate gross receipts for those tax years or is specifically stated by the Code for “start-up companies.” 
36 I.R.C. § 41(d)(4)(F). 
37 Suder v. Comm’r, 108 T.C.M. (CCH) 354, 362 (2014) (discussing I.R.C. § 41(d)(1)). 
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Section II.A.38  The technological information test requires that the research is conducted to 
discover information that is “technological in nature,” and the business component test requires 
that the taxpayer engaged in such research with the intent to discover information that would aid 
in developing “a new or improved business component of the taxpayer.”39  Lastly, the process of 
experimentation test requires that substantially all of the research activities be considered 
“experimentation,” meaning they are conducted with the intent of discovering “a new or 
improved function, performance, or reliability or quality” but not focusing on “style, taste, 
cosmetic, or seasonal design.”40  Interestingly, the credit does not apply to research concerning 
computer software development under certain circumstances.41 
The TCJA preserved this credit but made the following changes, which may impact 
certain taxpayers claiming this credit: the repeal of the corporate alternative minimum tax, the 
reduction to the amount of the Orphan Drug Credit, the repeal of the domestic production 
activities deduction, and the changes to the deduction for reseach and experimental expenditures 
that will take effect in 2022.42 
C. IRC Section 280C – Limitation on Benefits 
 As stated earlier in this section, taxpayers may benefit from the simultaneous use of both 
R&D tax incentive provisions, but Section 280C(c) places a limitation on such benefits. The 
effect of this section is not altered by the TCJA.  Taxpayers that benefit from the Section 41 
credit must reduce the deduction taken under Section 174 by the amount of the credit.43  If the 
                                                 
38 I.R.C. § 41(d)(1). 
39 Id.  
40 Id.; I.R.C. § 41(d)(3). 
41 I.R.C. § 41(d)(4)(E). 
42 Yair Holtzman, The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Doesn’t Cut the R&D Tax Credit, ANCHIN (Dec. 27, 2017), 
http://www.anchin.com/news/anchin-alert-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-doesnt-cut-the-rd-tax-credit.  
43 I.R.C. § 280C(c)(1). For tax years beginning after December 31, 2021, the language of this section is amended to 
account for the changes to section 174. 
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taxpayer chooses to capitalize the expenditures and the amount of the allowable credit exceeds 
the allowable deduction, the amount capitalized must be reduced by such excess.44  To avoid the 
obligation to reduce the Section 174 research deduction, taxpayers may elect to reduce the 
research credit.45  The credit reduction is equal to the allowable credit amount under section 
41(a) multiplied by the maximum corporate tax rate,46 which was reduced to 21% for 2018 in the 
TCJA.47  
 Choosing the credit reduction election does not impact the tax liability of corporate 
taxpayers.  But there are other reasons to consider making the election, the most significant being 
to reduce state taxable income.48  In calculating state tax liabilities, most states start with the 
taxpayer’s federal taxable income and add back the amount deducted for the research credit.49  
But if the reduced credit election is made, instead of a reduced deduction, which results in a 
higher taxable income, the taxpayer adds back the reduced credit to a lower taxable income than 
would exist if the reduced deduction had been taken instead.50 
D. IRC Section 250 – Foreign-derived intangible income and global intangible low-taxed income 
 
The TCJA added a new provision to the Code that is aimed at incentivizing the retention 
of intangibles in the United States.51  For taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017, 
section 250 permits domestic corporations to deduct 37.5% of their foreign-derived intangible 
income (“FDII”) through the end of 2025.52  After accounting for the new corporate tax rate, this 
                                                 
44 I.R.C. § 280C(c)(2). For tax years beginning after December 31, 2021, the TCJA has removed this paragraph.   
45 I.R.C. § 280C(c)(3). 
46 Id. 
47 I.R.C. § 11(b) (as amended by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 13001). 
48 Kevin A. Maillet et al., Reduced Credit for Increasing Research Activities, THE TAX ADVISER, June 1, 2008. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 14202. 
52 I.R.C. § 250(a) (codified by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 § 14202). The percentage drops to 21.875% for 
taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2026. This increases the effective tax rate to 16.406%. 
 8 
incentive provides for a maximum tax of 13.125% on FDII.  The deduction applies only to 
domestic corporations that are taxed as C corporations and includes “U.S. corporate subsidiaries 
of foreign-based multinationals.”53 
FDII is determined by multiplying deemed intangible income (“DII”) by the ratio of 
foreign-derived deduction eligible income (“foreign-derived DEI”) to deduction eligible income 
(“DEI”).54  DEI is calculated as the corporation’s gross income (less amounts accounted for in 
section 951(a)(1), global intangible low-taxed income (“GILTI”), financial services income, 
dividends received from a controlled foreign corporation, domestic oil and gas extraction 
income, and foreign branch income) over deductions allocable to gross income.55  Foreign-
derived DEI is DEI derived from the sale of property or services to a foreign person.56  Property 
must be sold to a foreign person for a foreign use, and services must be provided to a foreign 
person.57  DII is calculated by starting with DEI and subtracting 10% of the corporation’s 
qualified business asset investment (“QBAI”).58  QBAI is the quarterly average of the tax bases 
of depreciable tangible property used in a corporation’s trade or business.59  After calculating 
FDII, the amount of the deduction is limited if the sum of FDII plus GILTI exceed the domestic 
corporation’s taxable income.60  FDII would be reduced by an amount bearing the same ratio as 
the ratio of the excess just described over the sum of FDII plus GILTI.61 
                                                 
53 Lowell D. Yoder, David G. Noren, & Jonathan Lockhart, The New Deduction for Foreign-Derived Intangible 
Income, MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.mwe.com/en/thought-
leadership/publications/2018/01/the-new-deduction-for-foreign-derived-intangible.  
54 I.R.C. § 250(b). 
55 I.R.C. § 250(b)(3). 
56 I.R.C. § 250(b)(4). 
57 Id.; see also Yoder, supra note 53 (“The services may be performed within or outside the United States (but not in 
a foreign branch of the domestic corporation, which limits the extent of permissible qualifying activity outside the 
United States).”). 
58 I.R.C. § 250(b)(2)(B).  
59 Id. 
60 I.R.C. § 250(a)(2)(A). 
61 I.R.C. § 250(a)(2)(B). 
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In determining foreign use, there are special rules that apply for certain corporate sales.62  
For sales to unrelated persons, income is not foreign-derived if the corporation sells property that 
will be further manufactured in the United States or services that will provided to a U.S. person 
prior to being sold to a person outside of the United States.63  If the property is sold to a related 
foreign person, the related person must sell the property to an unrelated foreign person for 
foreign use or use the property in connection with property sold to an unrelated person.64  If 
services are provided to a related foreign person, the services must not be “substantially similar 
to services provided by such related person to persons located within the United States.”65 
The new FDII provision is not considered a patent box, but it has similar effects because 
it provides a lower tax rate for a certain type of intangible income and is similar to the U.K. 
patent box.66  However, the FDII provision may be more generous and provide preferential 
treatment to a broader range of income than the regimes implemented in other jursidictions.67   
The income base that the ratio is applied to is calculated as the excess over 10% of certain 
tangible depreciable property, meaning that excess is considered intangible income.68  There is a 
possibility that other sources of income not traditionally considered to be derived from the 
development of intangibles will receive preferential treatment.69  This is different from the 
Code’s former definition, which specifically listed certain assets as intangibles.70 
                                                 
62 Yoder, supra note 53. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Craig Rose, U.S. Tax Reform and BEPS Action 5 – the EU Spots the Missing Nexus, BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 12, 
2017) (“In short, it is a patent box in all but name.”). 
67 Ben Stupples, Q&A With Melissa Geiger, KPMG U.K. Head of Global Tax: Part One, BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY 
TAX REPORT (Mar. 15, 2018). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Isabel Gottlieb, New Intangibles Definition Causes Challenges for Multinationals, BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY TAX 
REPORT (Feb. 12, 2018). 
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III. INTERNATIONAL USE OF PATENT BOXES 
A. What is a Patent Box? 
A patent box is a tax benefit available for taxpayers that have business income derived 
“from the commercial exploitation of qualified IP.”71  A reduced tax rate or special deduction is 
available for businesses with qualified income, which results in a back end tax reduction that 
subsidizes successful investments.72  The “box” refers to the box checked on an income tax form 
when a taxpayer reports qualified income.73  Patent boxes may also be referred to as innovation 
boxes or intellectual IP boxes, depending on the type of income covered.  Innovation or IP boxes 
often cover income derived from non-technological innovations, such as trademarks and 
copyrights.74  Patent boxes are just one of the ways in which countries aim to encourage more 
domestic investment; many offer a variety of other tax incentives to cut the costs of R&D. 
 There are three elements of a patent box: the nature of the tax incentive, qualifying IP, 
and qualifying income.75  There are two possibilities for the nature of the tax incentive.76  A 
regime may provide for a lower rate to be applied to qualified IP income or may permit a 
deduction for a specified portion of qualified IP income.77  Under the deduction alternative, the 
effective tax rate on IP income is equal to the company’s marginal tax rate multiplied by the 
percentage of income that remains subject to taxation.78  
Qualifying IP must be “registered and held in the host country.”79  The types of IP that 
are eligible for a tax incentive vary by country.  However, most countries that currently use 
                                                 
71 GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44829, PATENT BOXES: A PRIMER 2 (2017). 
72 Merrill, supra note 4, at 848.  
73 GUENTHER, supra note 71, at 2. 
74 Id. at 2-3. 
75 Id. at 3. 
76 Id. at 3. 
77 Id. at 3.  
78 Id. at 4. 
79 Id. at 4. 
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patent boxes permit the incentive for patented inventions.80  Additionally, most countries permit 
qualifying IP to have been developed in another country if developed by a foreign permanent 
establishment of a resident company that is subject to tax in the jurisdiction providing 
preferential treatment.81  Lastly, current regimes vary on whether the patent box applies to 
acquired IP or IP existing before the adoption of the regime. 82  
Qualifying income may come from any one or more of the following sources: royalties, 
licensing fees, gains on sale/disposal of IP property, sales of goods or services integrating IP, and 
patent infringement awards.83  Countries have been divided in applying the patent box to gross 
income or net income generated from a company’s use of qualified IP.84  This distinction is 
relevant because it determines which rate expenses incurred in producing IP are valued at, in 
terms of tax savings.85  Implementing a patent box that applies to gross income, thereby allowing 
a company to deduct expenses from total gross income, will generally provide a more attractive 
tax benefit.86 
B. Summary of Various International Regimes 
This section summarizes the patent boxes implemented by countries that are centers for 
substantial R&D investment and that have complied with the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development’s (“OECD”) recommendations set forth as part of the Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting Project.87  These countries include Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, 
                                                 
80 Id. at 4. Of the sixteen countries that have implemented a patent box, Israel is the only country whose regime 
does not cover patented inventions.  
81 See OECD, COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT 
TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE, ACTION 5 – 2015 FINAL REPORT 25 (2015) [hereinafter ACTION 5 FINAL REPORT]. 
82 GUENTHER, supra note 71 at 4. 
83 Id. at 4. 
84 Id. at 4. 
85 Id. at 4. Deductible expenses may include R&D expenditures, marketing costs, and other administrative costs 
incurred to improve and finance qualified IP. 
86 Id. at 4. 
87 Id. at 6, 13.  
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Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.88  In addition to these countries, several other countries 
have implemented some form of a patent box.89  
The OECD is an organization that aims to promote policies that benefit the well-being of 
people around the world.90  It is made up of thirty-five member countries that work together to 
set international standards in a wide range of fields.91  The OECD supports encouraging R&D 
through the use of tax incentives.92  Its recommendations related to implementing patent boxes 
can be found in the OECD’s Action 5: 2015 Final Report (“Action 5 Report”), which was 
published in October 2015.93  The Action 5 Report focuses on the requirement of substantial 
activity when countries implement preferential regimes to prevent profit shifting.94  This reliance 
on “substantial activity” was set forth in the framework of the OECD’s 1998 Report, which 
initially proposed the need to focus on “counter[ing] harmful tax practices with respect to 
geographically mobile activities.”95  Although the report is dated twenty years ago, the 
importance of targeting harmful preferential regimes to achieve the goals initially set forth by the 
OECD has not diminished.96  Countries that have implemented harmful preferential regimes 
                                                 
88 Id. at 3.  While Italy’s regime going forward is in compliance with the Action 5 framework, it is important to note 
that the grandfathering treatment for older trademarks is still considered harmful by the OECD.   
89 Id. (“At the end of 2015, 16 countries provided some kind of patent box.”);  OECD, Harmful Tax Practices – 
2017 Progress Report on Preferential Regimes, OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project 17 (2017) 
(listing additional regimes reviewed after October 2015). 
90 About the OECD, OECD, www.oecd.org/about/. (last visited Nov. 15, 2017). 
91 Id. A list of the current member countries can be found at www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/. 
92 OECD, Growth, Innovation and Competitiveness: Maximising the Benefits of Knowledge-Based Capital, OECD 7 
(2013) (“International cooperation should extend not only to unintended tax relief for R&D . . . but also statutory 
policies for supporting R&D through tax credits and patent boxes.”). 
93 ACTION 5 FINAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 11. “The goal of the OECD’s work in the area of harmful tax practices 
is to secure the integrity of tax systems by addressing the issues raised by regimes that apply to mobile activities and 
that unfairly erode the tax bases of other countries, potentially distorting the location of capital and services.” The 
OECD committed the Forum on Harmful Tax Practices (“FHTP”) to evaluating preferential tax regimes and 
providing recommendations for implementing such regimes while avoiding artificial profit shifting.  
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 12.   
96 Id.  In determining whether a regime qualifies for consideration under Action 5, there are three factors to consider: 
(1) whether the regime is preferential; (2) whether the regime is potentially harmful; and (3) whether the regime is 
actually harmful.  Id. at 19.  A regime is preferential for Action 5 purposes if it targets geographically mobile 
activities and their income and offers even a small preference for taxation of such income in the home country, as 
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should either abolish such regimes or modify their features to comply with OECD 
recommendations.97  
Regarding IP preferential regimes, the OECD has endorsed the “nexus approach.”98  The 
goal of recommending the nexus approach is not to require implementation of a regime or to 
recommend a specific regime, rather it is to identify the outer limits of a patent box that will not 
have harmful, base-eroding effects on other countries.99  The nexus approach uses expenditures 
to meet the “substantial activity” requirement required by Action 5.100  This approach multiplies 
income derived from an IP asset by a “nexus ratio” to determine the IP income to receive 
preferential treatment, where the nexus ratio is calculated as the proportion of qualifying 
expenditures incurred in developing the IP asset to the overall expenditures incurred in 
developing the IP asset.101  The purpose of applying a nexus ratio is to ensure that qualifying 
taxpayers only receive benefits from the patent box to the extent that they actually incurred 
expenditures themselves and that such expenditures were directly related to development 
activities.102  This supports the rationale for implementing preferential regimes, which is to 
encourage taxpayers to invest in R&D. 
                                                 
compared with the taxation of other forms of income.  Id.  Income from intangibles is considered to be derived from 
geographically mobile activities.  Id.  To determine whether the preferential regime is potentially harmful, 
consideration should be given to the existence of now or a low effective tax rate on geographically mobile income, a 
ring-fenced regime, a regime that lacks transparency, and a lack of effective exchange of information.  Id. at 20.  
Lastly, a potentially harmful regime is actually harmful if it creates harmful economic effects, such as shifting 
activity to a country with a more preferential regime without generating significant new activity.  Id. at 21. 
97 Id. at 21.  
98 Id. at 9. The FHTP considered two other approaches: the value creation approach and the transfer pricing 
approach. The value creation approach gathered little support, as it required taxpayers to engage in a “set number of 
significant development activities.”  Id. at 24.  The transfer pricing approach would have required taxpayers to have 
a set level of significant functions in the regime’s jurisdiction. It also required that the taxpayer claiming the benefit 
of the regime was the legal owner of the IP, was using the IP, and was subject to the risks associated with the IP 
qualified for benefits under the regime. This gained some support, but many countries were concerned.  Id. 
99 Id. at 24. 
100 Id. at 24-25. 
101 Id. at 25. 
102 Qualifying taxpayers include “resident companies, domestic permanent establishments of foreign companies, and 
foreign permanent establishments of resident companies” subject to tax in the regime’s jurisdiction. Id. at 25. 
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Jurisdictions may use their own definition of what meets the criteria for qualifying 
expenditures, but expenditures must be linked to a specific IP asset and be for the purpose of 
conducting research and development.103  Examples include salary and wages, direct costs, 
overhead costs, and supplies costs as long as they are incurred to “advance the understanding of 
scientific relations or technologies, address known scientific or technological obstacles, or 
otherwise increase knowledge or develop new applications.”104  Excluded costs “include interest, 
building costs, acquisition costs, and other costs that cannot be directly linked to a specific IP 
asset.”105  
 Interestingly, the nexus approach allows for a 30% “lift-up,” which permits taxpayers to 
treat non-qualifying expenditures as qualifying expenditures, in an amount equal to 30% of the 
actual qualifying expenditures.106  The “lift-up” cannot cause qualifying expenditures to exceed 
overall expenditures (the nexus ratio may not exceed 100%).107  Qualifying expenditures are 
included in the nexus ratio in full in the year they are incurred, regardless of whether they must 
be capitalized for other purposes.108  Overall expenditures include all qualifying expenditures, 
acquisition costs, and related-party outsourcing costs that are not qualifying expenditures but 
exclude costs associated with unsuccessful R&D.109  The nexus ratio must be recalculated 
regularly because the nexus approach requires that life-time expenditures are used in the 
calculation.110 
                                                 
103 Id. at 27. 
104 Id. at 41-42. 
105 Id. at 27. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 27.  
108 Id. at 27. 
109 Id. at 28. 
110 Id. at 29. 
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For example, Company has one IP asset that generated income of 600.  Company 
incurred qualified expenditures of 100, acquisition costs of 10, and related party expenditures of 
40, so the nexus ratio will be 66.67% (100 / 150).111  As a result, Company will receive 
preferential treatment for IP income of 400 (600 * 66.67%).  If Company’s jurisdiction allows 
for the 30% “lift-up,” Company’s maximum qualifying expenditures will be 130 (100 * 30%), 
and Company’s new nexus ratio will be 86.67% (130 / 150).112  Now Company will receive 
preferential treatment for IP income of 520 (600 * 86.67%).  However, if instead of related party 
expenditures of 40, Company had related party expenditures of of 15, by using the “lift-up,” 
Company’s maximum qualifying expenditures would be 125 (100 * 30% = 130, but qualifying 
expenditures cannot exceed overall expenditures).113   
The nexus ratio is to be applied to income as defined by each jurisdiction, but the 
definition should follow two principles.  Qualifying income should only include income 
generated by IP and may include royalties, capital gains, income from the IP asset’s sale, and 
embedded income.114  Additionally, qualifying income should not be defined in terms of gross IP 
income; at most, it should be based on gross IP income minus IP expenditures.115  This ensures 
that taxpayers who do not have a 100% nexus ratio are unable to receive the patent box benefit 
on 100% of net income.116 
The nexus approach is only intended to apply to patents and other IP assets that are 
“functionally equivalent to patents,” as long as they are legally protected in a similar manner.117  
                                                 
111 Id. at 27. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 29. Embedded income is income derived “from the sale of products and the use of processes directly related 
to the IP asset.” 
115 Id. at 29. 
116 Id. at 29. 
117 Id. at 26. 
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In addition to the obvious inclusion of patents,118 the nexus approach would also cover 
copyrighted software and other assets that are “non-obvious, useful, and novel.”119  Other 
copyrighted assets and marketing-related IP assets, such as trademarks, are not considered 
qualifying IP assets.120 
Because of the nexus requirement, jurisdictions that implement patent boxes must track 
expenditures and income related to IP assets to ensure that the only income receiving preferential 
treatment is income resulting from qualifying expenditures on qualifying assets.121  This is not a 
significant issue for companies that have only one IP asset, but it becomes more complex when 
there are multiple IP assets.122  In the event that relating expenditures to certain IP assets would 
require arbitrary judgment, such as where more than one IP asset is used to create a product, the 
nexus ratio can be determined by accounting for expenditures incurred to create products that are 
the result of IP assets, and then the ratio would be applied to income generated from those 
products.123  This form of tracking complies with the nexus approach, but taxpayers must 
demonstrate a need to use this products-based approach.124 
If any existing or new FHTP jurisdiction plans to abolish its regime or amend it to 
comply wth Action 5, the OECD has provided guidelines for either closing off or grandfathering 
the regime.125  No new entrants can benefit from a non-compliant regime after the sooner of the 
                                                 
118 As used here, the term “patents” includes utility models, IP assets that protect plants and genetic material, orphan 
drug designations, and extensions of patent protection. It also includes extensions for certain patent protections. Id. 
at 26. 
119 Id. at 26. Jurisdictions that implement a regime that covers other non-obvious, useful, and novel assets must be 
transparent in the types of assets they cover. There should also be financial limitations on the taxpayers that seek to 
benefit from this category of IP assets.  
120 Id. at 26, 27. 
121 Id. at 30. 
122 Id. at 30-31. 
123 Id. at 31. 
124 Id. at 31, 32. 
125 Id. at 34-35; OECD, HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES – 2017 PROGRESS REPORT ON PREFERENTIAL REGIMES 28 (2017) 
[hereinafter 2017 PROGRESS REPORT]. 
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date a compliant regime takes effect or June 30, 2016.126  For taxpayers that have already 
benefited from an existing non-compliant regime, the grandfathering rules permit such treatment 
to be continued until June 30, 2021 at the latest.127  Jurisdictions should implement safeguards to 
ensure compliance with these rules and to prevent taxpayers from using related-party 
transactions to shift assets to benefit from grandfathered non-compliant regimes.128 
During 2016 and 2017, the FHTP reviewed a number of regimes for compliance with the 
Action 5 framework.129  Of the fourteen regimes listed in the 2015 Action 5 Final Report, nine 
jurisdictions have regimes that are not harmful, with one jurisdiction in the process of amending 
the regime, two were abolished, one is potentially harmful, and one is harmful.130  As of October 
4, 2017, twenty-three additional regimes have been reviewed.  Six have been determined to be 
not harmful, and thirteen are in the process of being amended to comply with Action 5.131  
During 2018, the FHTP will continue to review regimes for compliance and will consider 
revising the criteria used to assess regimes to provide clearer guidance.132  The remainder of this 
section summarizes key aspects of five regimes that comply with the OECD recommendations. 
C. Belgium 
In 2007, Belgium implemented a patent income deduction (“PID”), which allowed 
Belgian companies and Belgian permanent establishments of foreign companies (“PE”) to deduct 
80% of qualifying income.133  At the time, this resulted in an effective tax rate of 6.8% on gross 
                                                 
126 ACTION 5 FINAL REPORT, supra note 81, at 34. 
127 Id. at 35. 
128 Id. at 35. 
129 2017 PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 125, at 13. 
130 Id. at 15-16. 
131 Id. at 16-18. 
132 Id. at 23. 
133 Peter R. Merrill et al., Is It Time for the United States to Consider the Patent Box, 134 Tax Notes 1665, 1666 
(2012).  Qualifying income was considered gross patent income and excluded capital gain realized upon disposal of 
a patent. 
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patent income.134  Additionally, the law permitted deductions for development costs and other 
related expenses, lowering the potential effective tax rate even further.135  The PID applied to 
patents and supplementary protection certificates owned by Belgian companies or PEs or 
acquired by one as long as the patented product or process was further improved by the company 
at its R&D center.136  The R&D center could be domestic or foreign, but it must be able to 
operate autonomously.137  Patents must have been “granted or first commercially used on or after 
January 1, 2007.”138 
Upon notification that the OECD found that the PID was inconsistent with the nexus 
approach, Belgium abolished the PID and implemented a new regime consistent with the 
OECD’s nexus approach, and this remains the current regime in force in Belgium.139  This 
regime permits a deduction equal to 85% of net income from qualifying IP, which includes 
income related to patents or supplementary protection certificates, breeders’ rights, orphan drugs, 
data and market exclusivity, and copyrighted software.140  The deduction is limited to net 
income, but the unused portion may be carried forward.141  This created a new effective tax rate 
of 5.1% on qualifying income.142  Qualifying income is based on net income from royalties, 
capital gains from sale of qualified IP, process innovation income, and damages from 
infringement of qualified IP rights.143  Such net income is further adjusted to account for the 
                                                 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id.  The regime excludes income generated from know-how, trademarks, designs, models, secret recipes or 
processes, or information concerning experience with respect to trade or science.  Although under certain 
circumstances, know-how closely related to patents or supplementary protection certificates may qualify. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 KPMG, Parliament has approved deduction for innovation income, (2017), 
https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2017/02/tnf-belgium-feb3-2017.pdf.  
140 Id. 
141 GUENTHER, supra note 71 at 6. 
142 Id. at 6. 
143 Id. at 6. 
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proportion of qualified IP expenditures to a broader base of costs, including acquisition and 
related party outsourcing costs.144   
D. Italy 
 Italy’s regime was enacted more recently and permits an exemption for 50% of 
qualifying income starting in 2017, creating an effective tax rate of 15.7% on qualifying 
income.145  Qualifying income is net income from qualified IP, which includes income generated 
from a property owner’s direct use of IP.146  Qualified property must have been developed by an 
Italian-based company or an Italian subsidiary of foreign companies.147  Qualified property 
includes patents, industrial IP, and acquired IP.148  Trademarks were recently removed from the 
list of qualified property for companies electing treatment under this regime after December 31, 
2016.149  Those that opted for this treatment for trademarks before the preceding date are 
grandfathered in until June 31, 2021 at the latest.150   
E. Switzerland 
 Switzerland permits an exemption only in the canton of Nidwalden.151  The exemption 
applies to 80% of qualifying income, which is determined based on gross income from qualified 
IP sales and licensing, reduced by income derived from non-patent related services, such as 
financing, manufacturing, and routine work, and more notably, income from trademarks.152  
                                                 
144 Id. at 6. 
145 Id. at 7. 
146 Id. at 7. 
147 Id. at 7. 
148 Id. at 7. Although acquired IP receives preferential treatment, only 30% of acquisition or licensing costs are 
covered. 
149 KPMG, Italy: Conversion of Law Decree no. 50/2017- Corporate income tax measures, (June 23, 2017), 
https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2017/06/tnf-italy-june23-2017.pdf. This new rule was adopted to 
comply with the Action 5 Final Report recommendation that trademarks should never qualify for treatment under a 
preferential regime.  
150 Id. 
151 GUENTHER, supra note 71, at 9. A canton is a member state of the Swiss Confederation. 
152 Id. at 9. 
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Qualifying income must be generated by new and existing Swiss patents or comparable rights.153  
Overall, this creates an effective tax rate of 8.8%.154  In early 2017, the Swiss Federal Council 
proposed a new tax package entitled Tax Proposal 17, part of which would require all cantons to 
adopt a patent box regime to provide no greater than 90% relief and R&D deductions to provide 
no greater than 50% relief.155  The Federal Council aims to finalize the dispatch on Tax Proposal 
17 by the end of March 2018, which may lead to the implementation of the new patent box rules 
in early 2019 or 2020.156 
F. The Netherlands 
The Netherlands applies a 5% preferential rate to qualifying profits, which include net 
income from qualifying IP, including embedded royalties and gains on sales.157  The 2017 Tax 
Plan set forth a new definition for qualifying property (qualifying intangible fixed assets), which 
is based on the size of the taxpayer.158  For small taxpayers, the regime applies to in-house 
developed intangible fixed assets if an R&D certificate was issued by the Dutch government, and 
for large taxpayers, it applies to in-house developed intangible fixed assets (except for software) 
if an R&D certificate was issued and if a patent or similar right was granted to the taxpayer.159  
The Tax Plan also implemented the OECD’s recommended nexus approach.160   
G. United Kingdom 
                                                 
153 Id. at 9. 
154 Id. at 9. 
155 Switzerland Announces Consultation on Revised Corporate Tax Reforms, 2017 WTD 172-22 (Sept. 7, 2017).  
156 Switzerland to Prepare Tax Proposal 17 Dispatch, 2018 WTD 22-21 (Feb. 1, 2018). 
157 GUENTHER, supra note 71, at 8. 
158 KPMG: Meijburg & Co., Cabinet presents tax measures for 2017 on Budget Day, 8 (Sept. 20, 2016), 
https://meijburg.com/uploads/files/news/2016/09/Tax%20Plan%202017.pdf.  
159 Id.  A business is considered a small taxpayer if the average group turnover for five years is not greater than 50 
million euros per year and if the benefits derived from WBSO assets (R&D tax credit) is less than 7.5 million per 
year.  Any taxpayer that does not meet these requirements is considered a large taxpayer.  
160 Id. at 9. 
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The patent box adopted by the United Kingdom was enacted by Finance Act 2012 and 
went into effect in April 2013.161  The regime provides for a reduced rate of 10% on qualifying 
income, but the calculation is not as simple as just applying the rate to the amount of qualifying 
income.162  Companies may deduct, from their total profits, an amount equal to qualifying IP 
profits multiplied by the ratio of the difference between the corporate rate and the reduced rate to 
the corporate rate.163  After taking this deduction, the remaining profits are taxed at the corporate 
rate.164  The amount of tax payable on the total income should be the same as if the IP profits 
were taxed separately from non-IP profits, but the deduction approach was adopted to simply 
corporate tax return filing.165  Qualifying IP profits include income from the sale or licensing of 
qualified IP rights, proceeds from the sale of qualifying IP rights or licenses, and IP right 
infringement awards or other compensation.166  Qualifying profits may be derived from patents 
and related rights, plant breeders’ rights, and community plant variety rights.167 
The regime was modified by Finance Act 2016, which has resulted in different treatment 
for companies that have submitted patent applications or elected into the patent box regime for 
accounting periods starting after July 1, 2016.168  For these companies, the calculation for 
determining the amount of income that can qualify for the patent box benefit changes169 to 
comply with the OECD’s nexus regime recommendation.  Neither this Act nor the 2012 Act 
imposes a cap on the annual benefits provided by the regime.170 
                                                 
161 U.K. Issues Patent Box Technical Note, 2012 WTD 62-40 (Mar. 30, 2012). 
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IV. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES ADOPT A PATENT BOX REGIME? 
In 2012, the Economic & Statistics Administration at the U.S. Department of Commerce 
and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office prepared a report to determine which industries are the 
greatest users of IP commonly targeted by patent boxes.171  The report further analyzed the effect 
that the identified industries had on economic activity in the U.S.172  Industries that were the 
most intensive users of IP were defined as those that had a ratio of IP holdings to total 
employment that was greater than the industry average.173  The report was updated in 2016, 
concluding that 12 industries were patent-intensive between 2009 and 2014.174  The identified 
industries consisted largely of those developing chemicals/pharmaceuticals and 
electronic/computer equipment.175  
However, most patent boxes have been adopted too recently for researchers to 
definitively report on the long-term effects of the regimes, but some studies have indicated that 
countries that are currently using a patent box have seen an increase in the number of patent 
applications from both domestic and foreign companies.176  Because of the uncertainty as to the 
patent box long-term effects, this section will discuss the expected benefits and risks associated 
with adopting a patent box regime.  It will further discuss recent proposals for adopting one in 
the United States and will conclude with a discussion about the future of incentivizing R&D in 
the United States. 
A. Expected Benefits of Adopting a Patent Box Regime 
                                                 
171 Id. at 13. 
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175 Id. at 14-16. 
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The more obvious reason for adopting a patent box is to encourage IP investment in a 
host country, which can lead to larger tax revenues, preservation of the country’s tax base, and 
increased job growth.177  This same rationale supports the use of other incentives; however, 
patent boxes differ from other R&D tax incentives.  Patent boxes cast a wider net by promoting 
the commercialization of innovation, whereas R&D tax credits promote a narrower range of 
activities, solely related to conducting research.178  The commercialization encouraged by patent 
boxes is essential to respond to the increasingly competitive global environment and to promote 
economic growth.179  
Another reason that countries adopt patent box regimes is to attempt to correct market 
failure.180  Economists argue that companies engaging in R&D do not realize even close to all of 
the benefits that their investments produce because of the intangible nature of innovation that 
allows society to reap the benefits of a firm’s innovation.181  It has been estimated that inventors 
capture only 4% of the social gains provided by their innovations.182  While IP may be afforded 
protection, innovation still creates positive externalities, which effectively reduces the rate of 
return realized by the investor.183  Additionally, due to the amount of expenditures made before 
any benefit is realized, investments involve substantial risk.  Evidence suggests that the riskier 
projects are likely to result in more significant positive externalities, generating lower return.184  
Patent boxes attempt to resolve this problem not by reducing the cost of R&D but instead by 
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“increasing the benefits of success” by reducing the tax rate on qualifying income.185  While 
benefiting private companies, this can simultaneously benefit society by preventing firms from 
getting stuck in low-innovation equilibriums and incentivizing investment in higher value 
projects.186 
The adoption of a patent box regime does not require that a country abandon other R&D 
incentives.187  Patent boxes encourage the commercialization of the products created after R&D 
activities are complete, thus providing additional benefits for successful endeavors.188 
If a country is compliant with the OECD’s recommendations set forth in the Action 5 
Final Report, adopting a patent box should not pose tax avoidance or transparency issues.189  For 
a country to avoid having its regime labeled as actually harmful or potentially harmful, it must 
incorporate the nexus approach and require that companies benefiting from the regime track 
income and related expenditures expected to result in tax benefits.190 
B. Expected Risks of Adopting a Patent Box Regime 
 The most obvious risk of adopting a patent box regime would be the potential for 
decreased tax revenue.191  There is a concern over the need to offset the cost of implementing an 
patent box, especially considering the competitive rates adopted by other countries.192  The cost 
of reducing the tax rate would have to be smaller than the societal benefit that would be gained 
by implementing a patent box.193 And as stated at the beginning of this section, the success of 
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patent boxes is uncertain.  This consideration is especially important considering the recent 
significant reduction in the corporate tax rate.  
More direct tax incentives can be more advantageous than using a patent box and can 
achieve the same goal of incentivizing R&D.194  Front end incentives such as research credits can 
encourage certain types of R&D activities that may have a more significant effect on the 
economy.195  Additionally, these incentives may be more beneficial to companies in need of cash 
because they provide more immediate benefits, whereas patent boxes do not provide benefits 
until the project is successful, if at all.196  In addition to this delay in receiving benefits, which is 
not attractive for the cash-strapped taxpayers, the use of a patent box creates a disparity in the 
benefits received by taxpayers, resulting from the regime’s reliance on the profitability of the 
R&D investment.197  While countries that adopt a patent box regime need not eliminate R&D 
credits, the issue remains that providing tax incentives reduces national revenue, and using a 
patent box may impact other R&D incentives or other non-IP related incentives to make up for 
lost revenue.   
Lastly, while not permanent, implementation of a patent box that is compliant with the 
BEPS project would result in increased administrative costs due to the necessity of tracking 
expenditures and income.198  The mobility of IP income poses a challenge in offering a lower tax 
rate on such income due to tracking concerns.199  On the other side of the mobility argument, 
certain R&D activities may be difficult to move back to the United States because of the need for 
specialized facilities and skilled researchers.200  The nexus approach permits R&D activities to 
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take place outside of the taxpayer’s home country, but “this generally would give rise to a 
permanent establishment” in that other country and consequently income in that country.201 
 To conclude, countries with patent boxes also provide other R&D incentives, which 
suggests that countries adopt patent boxes to attract mobile income, which has been identified as 
a potentially harmful preferential tax practice by the OECD.202  There is a risk that encouraging 
R&D may not be the main motivator for adopting patent boxes, which is what the focus should 
be based on the Action 5 Final Report.203   
C. Past U.S. Patent Box Proposals 
A patent box proposal was first considered in 2007, when, in a report prepared by the 
U.S. Treasury, an issue was presented concerning the tax system’s distortion of where 
multinational corporations should exploit intangible assets, resulting in decisions about where 
income should be produced and expenses incurred.204  The report suggested a territorial system 
and lower tax rate or quicker investment write-off could provide a solution but concluded that 
the financial benefits might not be significant enough to counter the revenue loss.205 
Since then, there have been various other proposals for patent boxes.  Senator Dianne 
Feinstein introduced the Leveling the Playing Field Act of 2012, which proposed a 15% tax rate 
on “income from the sale of domestically manufactured products whose value is derived from 
domestically produced patents,” in an effort to incentivize R&D and promote manufacturing job 
growth in the United States.206  The Manufacturing Innovation in America Act of 2012 (H.R. 
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6544) and The Manufacturing Innovation in America Act of 2013 (H.R. 2605) both proposed a 
deduction of 71% from income, creating a 10% effective rate on qualifying income.207  None of 
these proposals were adopted.   
Representatives Boustany and Neal introduced The Innovation Promotion Act of 2015, 
which identified three goals: encouraging U.S. multinationals to remain in the United States to 
conduct IP activities, offsetting tax incentives for corporate redomiciliation, and incentivizing the 
retention of IP and jobs in the United States.208  It proposed a 71% deduction from a 
corporation’s innovation box profit, creating a 10.15% maximum effective corporate tax rate.209  
Innovation box profit was calculated as profits from the sale or license of qualified property 
multiplied by the ratio of domestic R&D costs to total costs, over the previous five years.210  
Qualifying property included patents, inventions, formulas, processes, designs, patterns, 
knowhow, products produced using manufacturing IP, films, videos, and computer software.211  
The proposal was not adopted.  It was estimated to lose billions of dollars over the course of ten 
years, and it was not believed to benefit innovators as other successful regimes are intended to.212 
D. The New FDII Provision 
According to Martin Kreienbaum, Chair of OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs, the 
FDII provision has caught the interest of European Union policymakers.213  As a result, the EU 
Code of Conduct Group is planning to assess the provision’s compliance with BEPS 
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standards.214  The provision does not incorporate the nexus approach;  however, Lafayette G. 
Chip Harter III, Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Tax Affairs, has assured 
that the United States will defend the provision because it has a “different purpose and effect 
from harmful preferential regimes for intellectual property income and must be assessed in the 
broader legislative context.”215  Harter further states that the FDII provision is not harmful 
because its intent is to remove the tax incentive to move mobile income outside of the United 
States.216  The House Ways and Means Committee also believes that the FDII provision 
complies with international tax rules and standards.217 
Additionally, finance ministers in the European Union indicated disapproval of the FDII 
deduction, claiming that it violates World Trade Organization (“WTO”) rules by creating an 
impermissible export subsidy.218  Professor Rebecca Kysar of Brooklyn Law School argues that 
this provision likely violates the WTO because the reduced tax rate on FDII will cause U.S. 
corporations to focus more on that market.219  Doing so will effectively create a government 
subsidy that makes the export market more attractive, which improperly interferes with 
international trade.220  Other export provisions have been enacted in the past but were 
subsequently scrapped due to international trade issues.221 
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As of April 2018, no one has filed a claim with the WTO, but the OECD began review of 
the provision on April 4, in response to the European Union’s request.222  Nothing has been 
reported on this review as of now, but if the OECD determines the FDII provision has created an 
illegal export subsidy, the EU intends to file a complaint.223 
E. What Should the United States Do? 
 At this point the United States should not adopt a patent box due to the revenue loss and 
concerns and the complexity that arises with the tracking requirements.  If the United States were 
to adopt a patent box, the legislation would need to address several issues, including the sources 
of income the patent box would cover, what the preferential treatment would be, and how the 
preferential treatment would apply to qualifying income.  All of the features would need to 
comply with the Action 5 Final Report because the United States is a member of the Inclusive 
Framework on BEPS.224  This would likely prove to be difficult, considering the recent proposals 
that have been rejected.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 While the expected benefits of a patent box sound attractive, the success of incentivizing 
R&D in such a manner is uncertain, so the United States should hold off for now on 
implementing a patent box regime.  This is especially true considering the recent overhaul of the 
IRC.  With uncertainty over the effects of new tax provisions, the already existent debate over 
the FDII provision, which is currently under review by the OECD, and the failure of multiple 
                                                 
the ETI’s repeal, Congress replaced the provision with the Section 199 deduction for domestic manufacturers, which 
has recently been repealed by the TCJA. 
222 Joe Kirwin, OECD’s Review of U.S. Tax Reform is Underway, BLOOMBERG BNA DAILY TAX REPORT (Apr. 6, 
2018). 
223 Id. 
224 Jones, supra note 176. 
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Congressional proposals in recent years, the United States is not in a position to incentivize R&D 
further through the use of a patent box.   
 
